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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the 
decision of the Utah State Tax Commission pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 59-1-602 (1) (a) (2000) and 63-46b-16(1) (1997) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED/STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Does the doctrine of res judicata prevent Nebeker from 
raising issues in this proceeding which it failed to raise in a 
prior proceeding involving the same parties and same facts? (R.-
40.) Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §59-1-610 the Court is to grant 
the Commission deference concerning the written findings of facts 
supporting its decision and apply a correction of error standard 
to its application of law. 
2. Does the doctrine of judicial estoppel have any 
application to the facts presented? (R.-37.) Pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §59-1-610 the Court should grant deference to the 
findings of facts supporting the Commission's decision and apply 
a correction of error standard to its application of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nebeker appeals the dismissal of its Petition seeking a 
partial refund of interest paid on special fuel taxes deemed due 
following its appeal of an audit assessment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Jim Nebeker Trucking is a common carrier headquartered in 
Roosevelt, Utah. (R.-89.) Nebeker's fleet of tanker trucks is 
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licensed under the International Fuel Tax Agreement ("IFTA") 
(R.-89.) 
By statutory notice dated November 20, 1995, Nebeker was 
assessed a deficiency of $29,988.03, plus interest. (R.-89.) 
Nebeker filed a Petition asserting some of its travel was not on 
the "public highways" of the State and was therefore not taxable. 
(R.-90.) 
On January 20, 1998, a formal hearing was held before the 
Tax Commission. (R.-88.) On May 12, 1998, the Commission issued 
a formal decision. (R.-88-102.) The Order granted partial relief 
to Nebeker, and the parties attempted to reconstruct Nebeker's 
off-highway mileage in accordance with the Order. (R.-100.) 
A second statutory notice was sent on or about September 30, 
1999. (R.-128.) After receiving additional information from 
Nebeker, a third statutory notice was sent on or about March 30, 
1999. (R.-129.) 
Nebeker did not file a Petition for Redetermination of this 
notice. The statutory notice became a final assessment pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §59-1-503 (2000) thirty days from the date the 
notice was sent, which would be on or about April 29, 1999. (R.-
128.) Nebeker tendered partial payment of the assessment on May 
14, 1999. (R.-172.) 
On June 9, 1999, Nebeker filed an original action in the 8th 
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District Court, Case No. 990000127CR1. Nebeker tendered the 
remaining amount due July 14, 1999. (R.-175.) On July 15, 1999, 
the Tax Commission moved to dismiss the District Court Complaint 
for lack of jurisdiction. (R.-46.) On August 26, 1999, Judge 
Lyle Anderson of the 8th District Court, granted the Motion. 
(R.-84.) On September 23, 1999, Nebeker appealed the District 
Court's dismissal2. 
On or about September 15, 1999, just prior to appealing the 
District Court decision, Nebeker applied to the Tax Commission 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §59-13-318(1996) for a refund of a 
portion of the interest paid. (R.-151-52.) The claim for refund 
was denied by the Auditing Division by statutory notice dated 
October 27, 1999. (R.-135-36.) On November 4, 1999, Nebeker 
filed a Petition for Redetermination to have the Tax Commission 
reconsider the Auditing Division decision. 
(R.-125-26.) 
On December 14, 1999, the Auditing Division filed a Motion 
to Dismiss the Petition asserting res judicata as a defense. (R.-
74,-108.) The matter was fully briefed and a hearing held March 
23, 2000. (R.-32,-37,-55.) On August 31, 2000, the Commission 
1
 The pleadings from the district court case are part of the 
record in Appeal No. 990835-SC which has been consolidated with 
this case. The pleadings are attached as exhibits to Appellee's 
Brief in Appeal No. 990835-SC. 
2
 Appeal of the District Court action has progressed as 
Supreme Court Appeal No. 990835-SC. 
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issued its decision and Order. (R.-10.) 
Nebeker filed its Petition for Review on September 28, 2000. 
(R.-l.) On November 9, 2000, the appeal was dismissed by Order 
of the Supreme Court for failure to file a docketing statement. 
On November 17, 2000, Nebeker filed its docketing statement and 
the appeal was reinstated pursuant to the Court's prior Order. 
On November 22, 2000, the Commission filed a Suggestion of 
Mootness regarding appeal no. 990835-SC. Following oral 
argument, the Court issued an Order dated January 18, 2000, 
consolidating this appeal of the Tax Commission's dismissal based 
on res judicata, appeal no. 20000834, with the appeal of the 
District Court's dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction, appeal 
no. 990835-SC. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The doctrine of res judicata has long been applied to agency 
decisions in Utah. Where an issue is raised, or could of have 
been raised, in a prior proceeding involving the same parties, 
which resulted in a final determination, the doctrine prevents a 
party from re-litigating those claims or issues in a subsequent 
proceeding involving the same parties. Nebeker was therefore 
required to raise all issues it had with its audit assessment in 
the prior proceeding challenging that assessment. Nebeker is 
therefore barred from raising issues which could and should have 
been raised in that proceeding in a subsequent proceeding 
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involving the same parties. Therefore, the Commission properly 
applied the doctrine of res judicata in barring this action. 
The Tax Commission has both constitutional and statutory 
authority over appeals challenging audit assessments. It 
therefore had subject matter jurisdiction over the prior 
proceeding. Nebeker's issue regarding the interest calculation 
was an issue which was present and required to be presented to 
the Commission in prior proceeding. The fact that Nebeker 
challenges the constitutional basis of the interest rate used 
does not excuse Nebeker from the obligation to raise the issue 
before the Commission. The issue is one that could have been 
mooted or avoided by the Commission in the manner in which they 
ruled upon the case. The Commission could have granted relief on 
other grounds not involving the constitutional question. 
The requirement in this State, as well as many other well-
reasoned decisions from across the country, is that a party must 
raise all issues it has with an administrative agency through its 
appeal before the agency. This is true even if the issue calls 
into question the constitutionality of statutes or rules which 
are beyond the agency's authority to revoke. This requirement is 
supported by sound public policy and will promote judicial 
economy and efficiency in the administration of justice. 
The doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply. The Tax 
Commission has not changed the legal position taken in these 
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proceedings from the legal position taken in the District Court 
action. Therefore, the Tax Commission acted properly in 
dismissing Nebeker's appeal and its Order of Dismissal should be 
affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Commission Properly Applied Res Judicata. 
The doctrine of res judicata deals with the preclusive 
effects given to judgments; it prevents parties from re-
litigating the claims that have, or could have been litigated on 
the merits and have resulted in a final decision. Salt Lake City 
v. Silverfork Pipeline Co., 913 P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 1995). In 
applying res judicata or claim preclusion, three criteria must be 
met. First, both cases must involve the same parties or their 
privies or assigns. Second, the claim sought to be barred either 
must have be presented or have been available to be presented in 
the first case; and third, the first suit must have resulted in a 
final judgment on the merits. In re: Rights to Use Water v. 
Springville 982 P.2d 65 (Utah 1999); citing Fitzgerald v. Corbit, 
793 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah 1990). 
The doctrine is premised on the principle that a 
controversy should only be adjudicated once. Although 
initially developed with respect to the judgments of 
courts, the same basic policies, including the need for 
finality in administrative decisions, support the 
application of the doctrine of res judicata to 
administrative agency determinations. 
Salt Lake Citizens Congress v. Mountain States Telephone & 
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Telegraph Co., 846 P.2d 1245, 1250 (Utah 1992). "The doctrine of 
res judicata has been applied to administrative decisions in Utah 
since at least 1950." Id. 
In this case, all three requirements are satisfied. First, 
both this case and the prior Tax Commission appeal, no.95-1597, 
involve the same parties; Jim Nebeker dba Nebeker Trucking as the 
Petitioner, and the Auditing Division of the State Tax Commission 
as the Respondent. This point is not in dispute. 
Second, the claim was available to have been presented in 
the first matter. In the prior matter the Tax Commission had 
issued a deficiency against Petitioner. That deficiency clearly 
calculated interest due at the rate of 12%. It is a well-
established rule that issues not raised before an administrative 
body are waived on appeal. Whitear v. Labor Comm'n, 973 P.2d 
982, 985 (Utah App. 1998); Gibson v. Board of Review of Indus. 
Comm'n, 707 P.2d 675, 677 (Utah 1985); Pease v. Indus. Comm'n, 
694 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1984); Ashcroft v. Indus. Comm'n, 855 
P.2d 267, 268-69 (Utah App. 1993). The policy for this rule is 
the promotion of judicial efficiency. By raising an issue at the 
formal hearing, the Commission could have adjudicated the issue 
concurrent with its deliberations on the other issues raised. 
Matters should not be litigated piecemeal, one issue at a time. 
The convoluted nature of the proceedings bringing the 
parties before the Court in these consolidated appeals are ample 
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evidence of the wisdom in requiring all issues to be raised in a 
single proceeding. Had Nebeker preserved the issue in appeal no. 
95-1597, it could have presented it directly to the Supreme Court 
on appeal of that decision. The Court would have the matter 
presented in context and, as the ultimate authority on state 
constitutional questions, could have issued a ruling in a timely 
and efficient manner. 
The fact that the issue was constitutional in nature 
however, does not excuse Nebeker from the requirement to raise 
the issue before the commission. In State Tax Comm'n v. Iverson, 
782 P.2d 519 (Utah 1989), the Court held that even though the 
Commission could not decide questions of legality and 
constitutionality, petitioners still had to follow the exclusive 
method of seeking redress through the Commission before appealing 
to a court capable of deciding those questions. .Id. at 525. 
Likewise in Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office, 621 P.2d 
1234, 1237,(Utah 1980); the Court found: 
Plaintiffs' assertion of a constitutional issue does 
not alter the necessity for compliance with the 
requirement of first adjudicating their claim before 
the retirement board. Administrative agencies do not 
generally determine the constitutionality of their 
organic legislation. (Citations omitted.) But the mere 
introduction of a constitutional issue does not obviate 
the need for exhaustion of administrative remedies. As 
stated in Public Utilities, 355 U.S. at 539-40, xif... 
an administrative proceeding might leave no remnant of 
the constitutional question, the administrative remedy 
plainly should be pursued.' 
The third requirement is also met. The prior hearing 
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resulted in a Final Decision of the Commission (R.88-101). 
Petitioner was required to raise all issues it had with the 
assessment at the formal hearing that was held in its appeal of 
the audit assessment, no. 95-1597. It failed to raise the issue. 
Therefore, Petitioner is precluded by the doctrine of res 
judicata from raising in a separate proceeding issues which could 
and should have been raised when it had its full day in court. 
The doctrine of res judicata "reflects the expectations that 
parties who are given the capacity to present their entire 
controversies shall in fact do so." Ringwood v. Foreign Auto 
Works, 786 P.2d 1350, 1357 (Utah App. 1990); (quoting Restatement 
2d Judgments §24(1982)). 
II. The Tax Commission Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over 
Appeal No. 95-1597. 
The thrust of Nebeker's argument is that the Tax Commission 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction in appeal 95-1597 to hear the 
interest issue; therefore, res judicata should not bar it from 
raising the interest issue directly in a subsequent appeal to the 
Commission. This argument must fail since the Commission had 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
The cases cited by Nebeker indicate that "typically agencies 
have limited subject matter jurisdiction." SMP v. Kirkman, 843 
P.2d 531, 533 (Utah App. 1992). While this statement may be true 
generally, the Tax Commission had both constitutional and direct 
statutory basis for subject matter jurisdiction. Appeal 95-1597 
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was an appeal of an audit assessment. The Utah Constitution, 
Article XIII, Section 11(3) grants the Commission both the duty 
and authority to "administer and supervise the tax laws of the 
state." This constitutional authority is reflected in the 
statutory language of Utah Code Ann. §59-1-210(2000) which also 
places the administration of the tax laws within the Commission's 
jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. §59-1-501(2000) gives the 
Commission authority to hear appeals based upon a petition for 
redetermination of an audit deficiency. Utah Code Ann. §59-13-
313(2000) gives the Commission specific authority for 
administration of Part 3 of Title 59, Section 13, special fuels. 
In addition to the authority granted under §59-1-210(25) to 
perform uany further duties imposed by law" and "exercise all 
powers necessary in the performance of its duties," the 
Commission is given specific authority in Utah Code Ann. §59-1-
401(10)(2000) (section effective until July 2, 2001) to "waive, 
reduce, or compromise any of the penalties or interest imposed 
under this part." 
Nebeker's Petition for Redetermination in Appeal No. 95-1597 
falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the Commission as 
granted by both constitutional and statutory authority. Nebeker 
has not claimed that the Order rendered in case no. 95-1597 is 
void. Nor do they appear willing to renounce the partial relief 
the Commission provided them in that Order. Therefore, Nebeker's 
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claim that the Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction in 
the prior appeal is without merit. 
III. Nebeker Was Required to Raise its Constitutional Issues 
in the Prior Proceeding. 
As argued above, the Commission had subject matter 
jurisdiction over the prior appeal. Appeal of agency decisions 
is statutory and requires compliance with the statutorily 
mandated procedures. See, Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Utah State 
Tax Comm'n, 999 p.2d 17 f 23 (Utah 2000). Utah Code Ann. §59-1-
601 provides for review of final agency actions by the District 
Court or the Supreme Court. District Court jurisdiction is 
limited by the Utah Constitution, Article XIII, Section 11, which 
allows the Legislature to provide for review of "matters decided 
by the Commission." It is well-settled that the Supreme Court 
will not review matters which were not raised before the 
administrative agency. Whitear v. Labor Commission, 973 P.2d 982 
(Utah App. 1988) . Therefore, under Utah law, a party having an 
appeal before the Utah State Tax Commission is required to raise 
all issues it has with the assessment in order to preserve those 
issues for appeal. 
This case is distinguishable from the authority cited by 
Nebeker. It does not involve a question of whether the agency 
had jurisdiction over the prior action. The Tax Commission 
clearly had subject matter jurisdiction over Appeal No. 95-1597. 
This case does not inquire whether Nebeker was required to first 
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initiate an action at the Commission before pursuing another 
remedy. In this case, Nebeker voluntarily filed a petition 
before the Utah State Tax Commission seeking appeal of its audit 
assessment. Extensive discovery was done. The parties briefed 
and argued several complex issues at the formal hearing. That 
hearing resulted in Nebeker receiving partial relief. If Nebeker 
had issues regarding the calculation of its tax deficiency, it 
was required to raise those issues in that proceeding in order to 
preserve those issues for appeal. 
Where the constitutional issue may be resolved by "any twist 
or turn the case may have taken at the Commission" a party is 
required to give the Commission the opportunity to resolve it. 
See, Brumlev v. State Tax Comm'n, 868 P.2d 796 (Utah 1993). If 
Nebeker had received complete, rather than partial relief, in 
appeal 95-1597, it is possible, if not likely, that no vestige of 
the constitutional issue would have remained. The Commission 
also has authority to waive or compromise interest, Utah Code 
Ann. §59-1-401(10), therefore the Commission could have granted 
the relief requested without ruling on the constitutionality of 
the statute. "If an administrative proceeding might leave no 
remnant of the constitutional question, the administrative remedy 
plainly should be pursued." Public Utilities Commission of 
California v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958); 3 Davis Admin. 
Treatise 20.04 (1958), as cited in Johnson v. State Retirement 
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Office, 621 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1980). The Court's final observation 
in Johnson applies with equal force to the fact situation 
presented here: 
The instant case involves issues other than the 
constitutional claim, and pursuit of plaintiff's 
administrative remedies might obviate the need for 
addressing that issue. If not, judicial attention to 
the constitutional issue, as well as other issues, will 
be better framed by the structure of a factual context. 
(Citations omitted.) (Id. at 1237.) 
Other jurisdictions have followed this reasoning and 
specifically required that constitutional challenges to taxes be 
brought before the administrative body charged with the 
administration of taxation. In Indiana v. Sproles, 672 N.E.2d 
1353 (Ind. 1996), the Indiana Court cited the following reasons 
for requiring a party to bring a constitutional challenge before 
the Department of State Revenue even though that Department had 
no authority to strike down a tax statute. First, the legality 
of a tax could not be challenged until statutory remedies had 
been exhausted. Second, requiring exhaustion as a prerequisite 
in constitutionally based challenges to a tax, served to preserve 
order in the tax collection process; and third, it would give the 
Department an opportunity to revoke the assessment on non-
constitutional grounds. Citing, Felix v. Indiana Dept. of State 
Revenue, 501 N.E.2d 119, 121-22 (Ind. App. 1986). 
This holding was reiterated in a recent Indiana case: State 
Board of Tax Commissioners v. Montgomery, 730 N.E.2d 680 (Ind. 
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2000). In that case, the petitioners attempted to bypass the 
administrative agency and file an action directly in the tax 
court challenging the constitutionality of the "health care for 
indigent property tax program." The Indiana Supreme Court found 
that the tax court lacked jurisdiction because the petitioner had 
failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. Citing Sproles, 
the court found that the taxpayer could not circumvent 
administrative remedies and challenge the constitutionality of a 
tax directly in court, even if the administrative agency to which 
the taxpayer appeals is without the power to grant the exact 
remedy the taxpayer seeks. .Id. at 684. 
The State of Missouri has adopted a similar policy. In 
LaMay Building Corp. v. Director of Revenue, 889 S.W.2d 835, 837 
(Mo. 1994), the court found that constitutional issues not raised 
at the first opportunity are deemed waived. Missouri has 
specifically held that when a party is challenging the 
application of a statute before an administrative agency on 
constitutional grounds, that party must raise the constitutional 
issue and preserve it for appeal before the agency. Duncan v. 
Missouri Board, 744 S.W.2d 524, 531 (Mo. App. E.D. 1988). The 
purpose of this rule is to bring to the attention of the tribunal 
the constitutional objection and allow the tribunal to correct 
itself. 
Moreover it is imperative to an efficient and fair 
administration of justice that a litigant may not 
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withhold his objections, await the outcome, and then 
complain that he was denied his rights if he does not 
approve the resulting decision. (Citations omitted.) 
Tate v. Dept. of Social Services, 18 S.W.3d 3, 7 (Mo. 
App. E.D. 2000). 
In McQuav v. Arkansas State Board of Architects, 989 S.W.2d 
499 (Ark. 1999), the Arkansas Supreme Court stated its rationale 
for requiring litigants to raise challenges to the 
constitutionality of a statute before the agency itself. 
[W]e will not set aside an administrative determination 
upon a ground not presented to the agency because to do 
so would deprive the agency of the opportunity to 
consider the matter, make its ruling, and state the 
reasons for its actions. (Citations omitted.) The 
same applies to constitutional arguments not raised at 
the agency level. Xd. at 344. 
The Arkansas Court went on to state: 
[E]ven though the Workers' Compensation Commission may 
not have authority to declare statutes 
unconstitutional, such constitutional issues should 
first be raised at the Administrative Law Judge or 
Commission level because such issues often require an 
exhaustive analysis that is best accomplished by an 
adversary proceeding, which can only been done at the 
hearing level. (Citation omitted.) IdL at 344. See 
also, Hamilton v. Jeffrey Stone Co., 641 S.W.2d 723 
(1982) . 
The Supreme Court of Iowa likewise requires that 
constitutional issues be raised at the agency level to be 
preserved for judicial review. Soo Line Railroad Co. v. Iowa 
Dept. of Transportation, 521 N.W.2d 685, 687 (Iowa 1994); Fisher 
v. Board of Optometry Examiners, 478 N.W.2d 609, 612 (Iowa 1991); 
Office of Consumer Advocate v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 465 
N.W.2d 280, 283 (Iowa 1991). This is despite the fact that the 
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administrative agencies lack authority to decide constitutional 
questions. Id. 465 N.W.2d at 283. 
The Georgia Supreme Court has also found that a 
constitutional challenge must be first raised in an agency 
proceeding. Georgia Real Estate Comm'n v. Burnette, 255 S.E.2d 
38, (Ga. 1979) . In Pence v. Georgia Board of Dentistry, 478 
S.E.2d 437, 442 (Ga. App. 1996), the Georgia Court of Appeals 
stated: 
The fact that one basis, or even the sole basis, of a 
respondent's complaint as to the hearing officer's 
initial decision is a constitutional attack, does not 
eliminate the necessity for agency review as a 
prerequisite to judicial review. (Citing Dept. of 
Public Safety v. Foreman, 202 S.E.2d 196 (Ga. App. 
1973) .) 
As pointed out in the above cases, an aggrieved party must 
raise and preserve all of its issues before the agency, even if 
those issues involve the constitutionality of statutory 
provisions which may be beyond the authority of the agency to 
determine. 
These cases also point out the distinction between subject 
matter jurisdiction and authority. Matters may be clearly within 
the subject matter jurisdiction of an agency even though the 
requested remedy may be beyond the agency's authority. 
In Nebeker's prior appeal before the Commission, No. 95-
1597, the Utah State Tax Commission had subject matter 
jurisdiction. Nebeker was required to raise all issues it had 
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with the assessment at that time. Even though the Tax Commission 
lacked authority to declare §59-13-501 unconstitutional, the 
Commission did have authority and ability to obviate or moot the 
question of interest by granting Nebeker relief from the tax 
assessment or by granting Nebeker relief from the interest on 
other grounds. Since the issue is one which could have been 
resolved by the Commission without reaching the constitutional 
question, it is clearly one which was required to have been 
raised before the agency. 
The requirement to raise a constitutional issue before an 
agency is supported by sound policy reasons as stated in the 
cases cited above. Those policies apply with even greater force 
when the constitutionality of a taxing statute is called into 
question. "This Court has consistently upheld the Tax 
Commission's authority to carry out its responsibilities in 
furthering its constitutional and statutory mandate" [to 
administer and supervise the tax laws of the State]. Howell v. 
County Board of Equalization, 881 P.2d 880, 889 (Utah 1994) . 
Because of the potentially disruptive affect that invalidating a 
state taxing statute may have on the operation of state 
government, the stated policy of the Court, that statutes are 
presumed to be constitutional3 and that constitutional issues 
See, Hovle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240 (Utah 1980). 
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should be avoided where possible4, should apply with even greater 
force when it comes to constitutional challenges to tax statutes. 
The Tax Commission as the agency given the constitutional 
duty to administer and supervise the tax laws of the State should 
be given an opportunity to rule on a matter where the ruling may 
moot or avoid constitutional questions. This rationale is also 
supported by the Court's recognition in Evans & Sutherland v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 953 P.2d 435 (Utah 1997), that the courts 
may not encroach upon the Tax Commission's role carrying out its 
constitutional duties. Requiring the constitutional issue to be 
raised before the Commission promotes the efficient use of 
judicial resources and administration of justice. If the issue 
cannot be avoided or resolved at the Commission level, it may be 
appealed directly to the Supreme Court for resolution. The Court 
would then have the advantage of having the issue presented where 
the factual context has been fully established in an adversarial 
proceeding. 
There is no question that had Petitioner taken a direct 
appeal from the ruling in case no. 95-1597 the Court would have 
not allowed it to raise the constitutional question. Whitear v. 
Labor Comm'n, 973 P.2d 982 (Utah App. 1988) . Nebeker should not 
be able to avoid this result by attempting to bring a second 
4
 Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 
637 (Utah 1979). 
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proceeding raising issues that were available to have been 
presented to the Commission in its original appeal. 
IV. Judicial Estoppel Does Not Apply. 
Attached as Exhibit "B" to the Tax Commission's Brief in 
Appeal No. 990835-SC, with which this appeal is consolidated, is 
the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Tax 
Commission's Motion to Dismiss the District Court Complaint for 
Lack of Jurisdiction. After addressing Nebeker's stated basis 
for jurisdiction, the Commission addressed the stated basis for 
venue, Utah Code Ann. §63-46a-12.1, as a potential basis for 
jurisdiction. That section provides, "A person aggrieved by a 
rule may obtain judicial review of the rule by filing a complaint 
with the county clerk in the district court where the person 
resides or in the district court in Salt Lake county." The rule 
also requires that the person exhaust their administration 
remedies by filing an action with the Commission before filing 
the complaint unless filing the action with the Commission would 
cause the person "irreparable harm." Utah Code Ann. §63-46a-
12.1(2) (a) and (2) (b) (iii) (1997) . 
The position the Tax Commission took at the prior proceeding 
was^that Nebeker would suffer no "irreparable harm" if it were 
forced to bring a challenge to the rule before the Commission as 
required by that section. In the course of making that argument, 
the following statement was made at page 5 and 6 of the 
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Memorandum. 
Although Petitioner alleges 'irreparable harm' in its 
petition, it does not state facts which would support 
any harm whatsoever. Petitioner alleges that the 
Commission failed to follow the provisions of the 
administrative rulemaking act in adopting the 
applicable interest rate. Even assuming, for purposes 
of argument, that Petitioner could prove its case in 
all respects, the only harm alleged or implied would be 
overpayment by Petitioner of interest on the 
assessment. There exists a statutory remedy for 
obtaining refunds of overpayments. A person in such a 
situation, if successful in proving their case before 
the Commission, could be made whole by the repayment of 
any overpayment with interest. Therefore, no harm 
would result, much less irreparable harm. Therefore, 
the irreparable harm exception to the exhaustion 
requirement of Utah Code Ann. §63-46a-12.1 does not 
provide Petitioner relief. 
The Memorandum goes on to argue that even if irreparable harm had 
been shown, that Nebeker's claim, if brought under §63-46a-12.1, 
would be barred by the specific provisions of Utah Code Ann. §63-
46a-14 which provides that such a contest must be brought within 
two years of the effective date of the rule. 
The statement Petitioner apparently relies on in making its 
claim is the statement that "there exists a statutory remedy for 
obtaining refunds of overpayments." The next two sentences of 
the Memorandum qualify the prior statement and point out the 
purpose for which it was made. They read, "A person in such a 
situation, if successful in proving their case before the 
Commission could be made whole by the repayment of any 
overpayment with interest. Therefore no harm would result much 
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less irreparable harm.5" This statement acknowledges that a 
person making a claim for refund would have to successfully 
overcome any defenses which may exist to that claim, factual or 
legal. The purpose of this statement was to argue that, by 
definition, irreparable harm is not the type of harm which can be 
compensated in money damages. Black's Law Dictionary, 7th 
Edition, defines 'irreparable injury' as, "An injury that cannot 
be adequately measured or compensated by money and is therefore 
often considered remediable by injunction - Also termed, 
'irreparable harm'." Therefore, the position taken in the prior 
litigation was that Nebeker had not made a showing of irreparable 
harm that would excuse it from the exhaustion requirement of Utah 
Code Ann. §63-46a-12.1, not because of the existence or 
nonexistence of a legal remedy, but because the harm claimed was 
for money damages and was therefore not uirreparable harm" by 
definition. 
There has been no "change of position" taken in this 
litigation. The position was, and still is, that Nebeker would 
suffer no irreparable harm if required to bring any challenge it 
had to a Tax Commission rule before the Commission prior to 
proceeding in District Court. 
The fact that the Commission raised a defense of res 
5
 See, Exhibit "B", Tax Commission Brief in Appeal No. 
990835-SC, page 6. 
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judicata to Nebeker's claim for refund is not a change of 
position from what was argued to the District Court below. Page 
6 of its Reply Memorandum attached as Exhibit "D" to the Tax 
Commission's Brief in Appeal No. 990835-SC the Commission states: 
Petitioner fails to point out that it has had one full, 
fair and complete hearing before the Tax Commission. 
Petitioner's failure to raise this issue at that time, 
may well form the basis for a Motion to Dismiss should 
Petitioner find a jurisdictional basis to maintain an 
action. 
The position taken in the prior matter, that Petitioner should 
have raised this issue in its prior hearing, is consistent with 
the defense of res judicata which formed the basis of the Tax 
Commission's ruling in this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The elements of res judicata were properly found by the Tax 
Commission. The constitutional claim which Petitioner attempts 
to raise separately in this action was a claim which was present 
at the time it contested its audit assessment. Since Nebeker 
failed to raise this issue in its prior appeal, the Tax 
Commission was correct in determining that the doctrine of res 
judicata would bar this action. 
Respectfully submitted this i^14 day of ffl^L 2001. 
Clark^L.Snelson 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Utah State Tax Commission 
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